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It was not supposed to be like this. In Chevron' and State
Farm,2 the Supreme Court announced what appeared to be con-
trolling standards for substantive review of administrative deci-
sions. Chevron adopted a two-step approach to statutory interpre-
tation under which courts were to overturn agency interpretations
that were contrary to the clear intent of Congress, but defer to
permissible agency constructions of a statute.' State Farm indi-
cated that an agency's policy judgments should be analyzed ac-
cording to a specific set of inquiries that focused on the agency's
reasoning process.4 Administrative law scholars, whether they
agreed or disagreed with the Court's standards, assumed that the
two cases were landmark decisions that signaled a turning point in
the substantive review of agency decisions5 Instead, the Chevron
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1. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
2. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.- Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
3. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
4. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
5. E.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
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framework has broken down, and State Farm has been all but
ignored by agencies and the courts, including the Supreme Court.
This article accounts for this breakdown by analyzing the
impact of judicial incentives on substantive review in administra-
tive law. Part I offers a model of judicial behavior based on the
"craft" and "outcome" components of judicial decisionmaking.
Judges engage in the well-reasoned application of doctrine as a
matter of craft, and they consider the implications of a result for
the parties and society in general as a matter of outcome. When
these components pull in opposite directions in a given case, our
model suggests how judicial incentives influence the resolution of
this tension. Part II uses our model of judicial behavior to explain
the lack of influence of Chevron and State Farm. Judges have
stronger incentives to control outcome and weaker incentives to
develop determinate craft norms that limit pursuit of outcome in
administrative law than in other areas of law. Because reliance on
"indeterminate craft norms enables judges to pursue outcome with-
out sacrificing craft, judges have avoided applications of Chevron
and State Farm that are determinate. Finally, Part III proposes a
modified approach to substantive judicial review that accounts for
the way that judicial incentives influence substantive review doc-
trine. We recommend that Congress require courts to respond to a
series of specific questions that would apply to substantive agency
decisions. These questions would make it more difficult for judges
to manipulate scope of review standards and would require more
explicit reasons for affirming or reversing an agency decision.
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 455 (1989); Merrick B. Garland, Deregula-
tion and Judicial Review, 98 HARv. L. REV. 505, 513 (1985); Robert Glicksman &
Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 295-96; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political
Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and
Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. RF v. 481, 483 (1990) [hereinafter Pierce, Political Control]; Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 302 (1988); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald
Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1023; Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Deci-
sions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 423; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agen-
cy Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1095 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the
Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 177, 178.
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I. MODEL OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
This section offers a model of judicial behavior based on
judicial incentives to pursue the craft and outcome components of
judicial decisions. Our model, which draws on the burgeoning lit-
erature on social choice (or institutional theory) and judicial be-
havior,6 reveals that a tension exists between the craft and out-
come components that can be relieved by the adoption of indeter-
minate craft norms.
A. Craft and Outcome
Our model of judicial behavior begins by identifying two gen-
erally accepted components of judicial decisionmaking that we call
"craft" and "outcome." By craft, we mean the well-reasoned appli-
cation of doctrine to the circumstances of a particular case.7 Craft
reflects the values of consistency with constitutional and statutory
provisions and continuity with prior caselaw, but permits inter-
stitial evolution and, in exceptional cases, overruling precedent.8
Outcome, on the other hand, focuses on the result in a given case
and its implications for the parties and society as a whole; it re-
flects the values of justice and social utility as filtered through a
judge's worldview. A "pure" craft orientation is outcome-neutral in
the sense that the judge does not consider the implications of a
given result for the parties or society in general. Under a "pure"
outcome orientation, the judge would not consider consistency
6. See, eg., SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1985); DAVID W. RHODE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SU-
PREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND
(1965); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
(1959); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATITrUDINAL MODEL (1993); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence
from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992) [hereinafter The Motives
of Judges]; Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional"
About the Sentencing Commission, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 183 (1991) [hereinafter Ex-
plaining Judicial Behavior]; Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses
and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827; Richard A. Posner,
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP.
Cr. ECON. REV. 1 (1993); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and
the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296 (1993).
7. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
214-15 (1960) (describing the appellate judge's job as the application of "craft").
8. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAIING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 222 (1993).
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with positive law or continuity with prior cases to be relevant to a
decision.
Neither a pure craft nor a pure outcome orientation exists in
practice. All judges value both craft and outcome to some degree,
and many decisions involve some combination of craft and out-
come.9 The value that a judge accords craft and outcome in a
particular decision reflects the utility that the judge gains from a
particular orientation. The next section considers why judges value
both craft and outcome, and the following section explains the
relationship of these components of judicial review.
B. Judicial Utility
Social choice theory has had some difficulty accounting for
judicial behavior because the judiciary has been structured to
sharply reduce the self-interested motivations typically identified
with other political actors (e.g., financial rewards, promotion, re-
election).'0 Nonetheless, three types of incentives are recognized
in the literature and accord with our observations of the real
world of judicial behavior: respect, ideological utility, and lei-
sure." Judges typically gain respect by a craft orientation and
obtain ideological utility from an outcome orientation. A judge's
pursuit of leisure, by comparison, is not strongly correlated with
either craft or outcome.
9. See id. at 118 ("The judge's interest in the well-being of the law encompasses a
variety of concerns--the concern for doctrinal coherence, for example, and for the re-
sponsiveness of doctrine to social and economic circumstances.").
10. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 827 ("Given the set of institutional constraints
under which judges routinely labor, the basic assumption of public choice theory-that
self interest rules behavior in public as well as private transactions-should yield only
weak and instructive generalizations about judicial behavior."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corpo-
rations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931, 1967 (1991) ("Developing a theo-
ry that relies upon judges' responsiveness to political pressures . . . presents something of
a puzzle."); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 50, 69 (1987) (suggesting that judges have no rational incentives to en-
force interest-group bargains); Posner, supra note 6, at 4-5 (explaining that judicial sala-
ries are fixed and do not vary with performance or outcome). But see Eugenia F. Toma,
Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J.
LEGAL STuD. 131, 146 (1991) ("As long as the Congress controls the purse strings, mem-
bers of the Supreme Court will not be totally autonomous agents."); Zeppos, supra note
6, at 298 (arguing that powerful interest groups prefer that judges engage in
nondeferential review).
11. See Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 6, at 186; Macey, supra note 10, at
70; Posner, supra note 6, at 13-15.
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1. Incentives. Both the respect of others and self-respect are
important motivating factors for judges. Judges value the prestige
and esteem associated with their position and wish to maintain
and enhance their reputation within the bench and bar.2 Like-
wise, judges understandably take pride in their work and gain
satisfaction from a job well done. 3 At one level, respect (par-
ticularly self-respect) is valued for its own sake. At another level,
a good reputation is valuable because it enhances a judge's in-
fluence within the profession and, through that influence, the
judge's ability to influence other judges. 4 Finally, reputation af-
fects a judge's limited opportunities to gain financial rewards or
promotion. 5
Judges also gain utility from influencing public events in ac-
cordance with their worldview. Implementing one's ideology may
reflect a judge's self-interest because decisions favoring groups of
which the judge is a member (e.g., property owners) also benefit
the judge. 6 Because judges must avoid cases in which they have
a financial interest, 7 however, this form of self-interest has at
best an indirect influence. 8 A judge might also gain satisfaction
from influencing public events because judicial decisionmaking is
an exercise in power, which may be valued for its own sake. 9
For many political actors, however, ideological preferences are
12. Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and Judicial Behavior Macey's Public
Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 183, 221-22 (1991); Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra
note 6, at 186.
13. Posner, supra note 6, at 19.
14. See Macey, supra note 10, at 70; Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External
Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 94 (1989).
15. See Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 6, at 188; The Motives of Judges,
supra note 6, at 16.
16. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurispru-
dence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 420 n392 (1995) (suggesting that the
"class based implications" of recent Supreme Court Contracts and Takings Clause cases
"may reflect the conscious or unconscious pursuit of doctrinal positions that furthered the
interests of conservative Justices' political constituencies.").
17. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (1988); see Joan Biskupic & Albert B. Crenshaw, White
House Responds to Ethics Concerns on Breyer's Rulings in Toxic Waste Cases, WASHING-
TON POST, July 12, 1994, at A6 (describing the controversy concerning the possible con-
flict of interest of a Supreme Court nominee in cases that he decided as a federal appel-
late judge).
18. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 19.7, at 534 (4th ed.
1992).
19. Posner, supra note 6, at 17.
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"other regarding"; they reflect a sense of individual or social
justice that transcends any identifiable self-interest.21 This motiva-
tion would appear to be even greater for judges, who are not
burdened by the necessity of being reelected. 2
In addition to respect and ideological orientation, social choice
scholars posit that judges seek to reduce their work and expand
their leisure time.' In this sense, judges are no different from
other people-they work because the utility gained from working
outweighs the opportunity costs in terms of pursuing other activi-
ties. The incentive to work hard is reduced because judges lack
the financial rewards typically attached to job performance; howev-
er, judges will pursue leisure only when the utility they gain from
it outweighs the respect-based and ideological utility they may
gain through work.
2. Behavior. Judicial behavior is affected by the incentives
discussed above because the craft and outcome components of
judging affect the extent to which judges obtain respect, ideo-
logical rewards, and leisure. Judges generally gain respect from a
craft orientation and ideological rewards from an outcome orien-
tation, although the opposite associations can occur. Leisure,
however, is not directly correlated with either craft or outcome.
Respect as a motivating factor will generally favor a craft
orientation because of the legal profession's norms.24 The legal
profession holds craft in high regard because it preserves consis-
tency and predictability in the law.' These attributes also serve
20. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and thePublic Agenda: Toward A Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167, (Special Issue
1990).
21. See Patricia M. Wald, The Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman Judge's Per-
spective, 4 LAW & INFQ. J. 3, 12 (1986) (discussing the sources to which a judge should
turn for guidance when she must answer difficult questions of morality); Steven Kelman,
Why Public Ideas Matter, in THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 32, 32 (Robert B. Reich ed.,
1988) (explaining that public officials are influenced by public policy concerns).
22. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Proce-
dure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 631 (1994) [hereinafter Judicial Preferences]; see Levine &
Forrence, supra note 20, at 193 (stating that public officials' responsiveness to voters is a
function of the risk that taking a position will cost votes).
23. E.g., Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 6, at 187.
24. See Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phen-
omenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 527 (1986) (arguing that friends and enemies will
see the judge as "having violated a role constraint" if the judge does not offer a "good
legal argument" for a decision).
25. STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 18
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to establish the accountability of judges and therefore impact
significantly on the legitimacy of the judiciary.26 Although a judge
normally gains respect by pursuing a craft orientation, outcome
may also be important for a judge's self-respect and reputation in
some circumstances and some circles. For example, when a case
presents issues critical to a judge's values, the judge's self-respect
may compel an outcome consistent with those values. Moreover, if
a judge values what persons holding certain ideological views think
of him, the outcome in certain cases may also be important.27
Ideological utility generally favors an outcome orientation
because it is the outcomes of judicial decisions that influence pub-
lic events. The effect of ideology, however, is complicated by two
factors. First, a judge's ability to influence events is to some de-
gree dependent on the judge's allegiance to craft; a decision that
substantially departs from craft may not influence other judges
because they usually hold conformance with craft in high regard.
Second, craft is often an important component of a judge's ideolo-
gy because that ideology will include beliefs concerning the-
judiciary's role in a democratic society. These beliefs will affect
(and will probably limit) how a judge will act on other ideological
values such as fairness, equity, or the role of the government in
the economy.
We see no consistent correlation between the pursuit of lei-
sure and either a craft or an outcome orientation.' Judges may
pursue outcomes that reduce their workloads, but it is not easy to
identify what those outcomes might be. On the one hand, the
"easiest" path in many cases may be adhering to doctrine, which
would tend to support a craft orientation.29 On the other hand,
some outcomes may reduce a judge's caseload by closing off ac-
cess to the courts in future cases. There is at least'some empirical
evidence, however, that judges will not seek to reduce their work-
load when doing so would reduce their power and authority.'
(1985).
26. Id. at 167-68.
27. The Motives of Judges, supra note 6, at 16; see David A. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE LJ. 1491,
1507-08 (1992) (describing ideological screening of judges by the executive branch).
28. See Judicial Preferences, supra note 22, at 629 (noting that the preference for
leisure may be consistent or inconsistent with other judicial incentives).
29. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 528.
30. See Explaining Judicial Behavior, supra note 6, at 198 (stating that judges with
105719951
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Given the attenuated correlation between leisure and craft or
outcome orientation, our model focuses on how the respect and
ideological incentives influence the relationship between craft and
outcome.
C. Judicial Utility and Doctrinal Determinacy
In light of the previous discussion, we offer certain basic
conclusions about the relationship between craft and outcome and
its implications for judicial decisions. Our basic contention is that
a judge's outcome orientation is a function of the determinacy of
craft norms.
Outcome orientation and craft norms may be clearly consis-
tent or inconsistent. If they are consistent, judges will decide cases
in accordance with their preferred outcome. In this context, a
judge can maximize ideological utility without sacrificing the re-
spect that comes from following craft. If craft and outcome are
clearly inconsistent, judges will tend to follow a craft orientation
for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, craft is the dominant com-
ponent of judicial decisionmaking 1 As a result, judges who ig-
nore clear craft norms in order to pursue an outcome orientation
are likely to suffer a loss of respect among fellow jurists, lawyers,
and the public.32 Second, an outcome orientation may be self-de-
feating. In the case of lower courts, decisions that clearly conflict
with craft norms are likely to be reversed on appeal, thus sacrific-
ing respect based on adherence to craft norms without having any
influence on public events. At the appellate level, including the
Supreme Court, collegiality operates as a constraint; a judge or
Justice's ability to pursue outcome is limited by the necessity of
gaining a majority for a given result. More generally, whether
crowded dockets tended to rule that the U.S. Sentencing Commission was unconstitutional
and that those judges with prospects of being appointed to a vacant appeals court posi-
tion were less likely to do so).
31. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
32. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 529 (claiming a direct correlation between the
judge's "stock of legitimacy ] at stake" and the degree of inconsistency between pre-
ferred outcome and applicable craft norms.) This loss of reputation can have more than
psychological effects. Despite the increasing attention to ideology in judicial appointments,
for example, a nominee without a sufficient reputation for craft might be rejected. See,
e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 148 (1989) (noting that Judge Bork's opponents successfully characterized him
as being outside of the mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence).
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decisions have a lasting impact is a function of their consistency
with, and a judge or Justice's reputation for, craft.
The extent to which craft will constrain the pursuit of out-
come orientation is related to the determinacy of the craft
norms.33 As Figure 1 illustrates, the more determinate the norm
is, the more likely it is to constrain a judge's pursuit of an out-
come:
Indetermir ate Average
/Judge
C// /
A
B D
No outcome All outcome
In Figure 1, the Y axis reflects the determinacy of applicable craft
norms. Norms may be completely determinate (at the bottom of
the axis), completely indeterminate (at the top of the axis), or
somewhere in between. For purposes of Figure 1, we assume that
judges cannot affect the level of determinacy and must accept
applicable craft norm The X axis reflects the pursuit of out-
come in which a judge has the choice of pursuing outcome en-
tirely (at the right extreme), not at all (at the left extreme), or to
some extent in between these extremes.
We posit that the average judge becomes less outcome-orient-
ed as craft becomes more determinate (upward sloping line
33. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 549 (stating that the judge tries to move "the
law in the direction of [the preferred outcome], and to the extent the law is resistant,
[the judge is] under pressure to move toward the law").
34. How judicial incentives affect preferences for determinate or indeterminate craft
norms is discussed infra following note 37.
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marked "average judge"). When craft is very determinate (A), the
judge will feel constrained in pursuing outcome and act according-
ly (B). When craft is very indeterminate (C), the judge will feel
freer to pursue outcome and will be more outcome-oriented (D).
The judge will behave in this manner for several reasons. It is
more difficult to reconcile the pursuit of a given outcome with
apparently contradictory craft norms when those norms are more
determinate. This problem increases the likelihood that a judge's
pursuit of outcome would be regarded as sacrificing craft and thus
entails a loss of respect. In addition, it is more likely that the
institutional constraints of collegiality and appellate review would
frustrate the judge's pursuit of outcome. Finally, the effort to
reconcile the outcome with more determinate craft norms may
interfere with the pursuit of leisure.
Figure 1 indicates how the level of determinacy affects the
average judge. The extent to which particular judges are con-
strained by determinacy depends on two factors. First, if a judge
can successfully manipulate craft norms, he will be less constrained
in reaching a preferred outcome.15 When craft is successfully ma-
nipulated, the judge has a lower risk of a loss of respect for an
outcome-oriented decision. Indeed, great judges are not only bril-
liant at manipulating craft norms, but also enhance their reputa-
tion by doing so.36 Nevertheless, most judges are constrained by
more determinate craft norms because they are more difficult to
manipulate.
Second, as Figure 2 indicates, individual judges will have
different preferences concerning craft and outcome when the two
are in conflict:
35. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 530-42 (describing legal techniques to manipulate
craft norms towards a preferred outcome).
36. LLEWELLYN, supra note 7, at 214-15.
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FIGURE 2
In Figure 2, some judges (indicated by the upward sloping line
marked "craft-oriented judge") will hew more closely to craft as
indeterminacy increases than the average judge. These judges
value craft more and outcome less than the average judge, and
will therefore struggle to apply even relatively indeterminate craft
norms without regard to outcome. Other judges (indicated by the
upward sloping line marked "outcome-oriented judge") will be
more resistant to following craft even when craft is relatively de-
terminate. These judges value outcome more and craft less than
the average judge. For example, a judge might find that outcome
is important because a case implicates values that the judge con-
siders important or because the judge covets the respect of a
group of persons who care intensely about the outcome.37 At the
same level of determinacy (A), the craft-oriented judge will be less
likely to pursue outcome (B) than the outcome-oriented judge (C).
Although the model to this point has assumed that judges
take the level of determinacy as a given, judges actually have
significant control over the determinacy of craft norms. Because
doctrinal indeterminacy permits judges to pursue outcome without
sacrificing craft-thus maximizing utility from respect, ideology,
and leisure-it is not surprising that much of judicial doctrine is
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
10611995]
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indeterminate. Balancing tests, for example, permit judges to reach
more outcome-oriented decisions without a sacrifice of craft.
Open-ended tests, such as reasonableness, serve the same function.
Judicial incentives to create indeterminate doctrine are self-
limiting, however. Indeterminacy can increase a judge's ability to
pursue an outcome in a particular case, but it also reduces the
judge's ability to influence outcomes in future cases. For example,
if judges can overrule past decisions easily, they can reach desired
outcomes despite the limits of doctrine; but this also means that
their present decisions can easily be overruled by future courts.38
Thus; the optimal level of doctrinal determinacy in a given field
(for given judges) will depend on the relative strengths of the
desire to pursue outcomes in present cases and to influence out-
comes in future cases.
II. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
Both craft and outcome are important to a judge in general.
When there is a conflict, the judge must determine to what extent
he or she will sacrifice craft for an outcome-oriented decision. The
tension between craft and outcome, however, can be reduced to
the extent that craft norms are vague and indeterminate. Courts
will create indeterminate craft norms when judges are particularly
concerned about outcomes in present cases, especially if their
concern for influencing future decisions is limited. Judicial behav-
ior in substantive review of administrative decisions is consistent
with this prediction, which helps explain the decline of Chevron
and State Farm.
A. Judicial Incentives
Judicial incentives in administrative law are more oriented
towards the pursuit of outcome than in other legal areas for two
reasons. First, the utility of being outcome-oriented is greater than
in private law areas. Second, the disutility of having indeterminate
craft norms is not as great as in other legal areas. In light of these
influences, judges favor indeterminate craft norms.
38. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 217
(1985) (arguing that conservative judges should not be bound by judicial restraint to
respect liberal decisions).
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Judges have stronger incentives to pursue an outcome orienta-
tion in administrative law because, as compared to most private
litigation, administrative law cases are more likely to involve im-
portant issues of public policy.39 This is especially true if, as is of-
ten the case, an agency decision has far-reaching implications for
society because of its general applicability. The importance of such
cases increases the utility that a judge derives from an outcome-
oriented result that favors his or her worldview.4 In administra-
tive law, indeterminate judicial review norms permit a judge, with-
out a loss of respect, to intervene when the agency decision runs
counter to the judge's strongly held values and to defer when the
agency decision is consistent with them.4
Judicial incentives are different in administrative law in a
second way that affects the determinacy of judicial review doc-
trines. A judge ordinarily prefers an indeterminate craft norm.
However, the use of such a norm limits the judge's ability to
influence the resolution of future cases because other judges are
also less constrained in pursuing their own views of an appropriate
outcome.4 In administrative law, however, the desire to influence
future outcomes by the adoption of determinate craft norms is
especially weak. For example, a judge might favor a more deter-
mine craft norm for a specific agency. The number of agencies
39. This is not to say that all administrative decisions have important public policy
implications; indeed, the vast majority probably do not. It is therefore to be expected
that the majority of agency decisions will be affirmed notwithstanding the indeterminacy
of deferential craft norms. However, a significant portion of high-profile cases, particularly
those that make it to the Supreme Court, involve important public policy considerations.
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (involving the prohibition on abortion
counseling, referral, and advocacy for clinics receiving federal funds); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (involving federal motor
vehicle safety standards); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607 (1980) (involving the federal standard on permissible exposure to certain
hazardous substances).
40. Of course, some judges may place great weight on the outcome of a particular
case for the parties and have little concern for broader public policy considerations.
These judges may have stronger incentives to pursue outcome in private law cases than
in public law cases. On the whole, however, we believe that judges in general, and ap-
pellate judges in particular, are likely to derive greater ideological utility from deciding
cases with broad public policy implications.
41. Judicial Preferences, supra note 22, at 640-41.
42. As noted previously, judges' pursuit of outcome is often limited by their desire
to create a rule that is binding on later courts. If judges adopt a rule that is relatively
indeterminate, future judges will be less constrained in pursuing an outcome orientation.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
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and the variety of contexts in which agencies render decisions,
however, make it unlikely that the judge will have the same atti-
tude concerning the policy views of all other agencies.43 A second
problem is that the judge cannot be certain which political party
will control the executive branch or what regulatory philosophy
the administration might adopt. Since judges serve for life, they
will typically see a number of administrations come and go. This
means that judges will encounter agencies with opposing views on
public policy in the future. Thus, judges will be reluctant to estab-
lish a determinate craft norm to control future cases. Even if a
judge generally favors the regulatory approach of the current
administration, there will still be situations in which the judge's
strongly held values require intervention or in which the judge
would prefer intervention by other judges with similar views of
public policy.4'
B. Doctrinal Indeterminacy
Our model predicts that judicial incentives in administrative
law favor reliance on indeterminate craft norms for judicial review.
As discussed below, the behavior of judges in administrative law is
consistent with this prediction. Indeterminacy in judicial review has
been achieved primarily through two mechanisms: the use of open-
ended "standards" of deference and the proliferation of manipula-
ble categories to which different degrees of deference apply. Judi-
cial reliance on open-ended standards is illustrated by the scope of
review applied to agency policy decisions. The use of manipulable
categories is illustrated by judicial review of statutory interpreta-
tion. While State Farm and Chevron appeared to introduce more
determinate doctrines in each area, respectively, subsequent devel-
43. Despite the President's ability to influence agency decisions through appointments,
direct oversight, and removal, it is unlikely that all agency decisions reflect a uniform
public policy perspective; some agencies are independent (and may contain carry-over ap-
pointments), and the permanent staff of agencies are often resistant to the policy agenda
of political appointments. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration
of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1994) (describing the problem of "slack"
in regulatory agencies). Even if agencies did reflect the President's policy perspective, it
is unlikely that any given Justice-much less the Court as a whole-would agree with
every aspect of that policy.
44. This insight may explain why judges apparently follow interest-group preferences
against highly deferential review doctrines. See Zeppos, supra note 6, at 298 (arguing that
judicial activism reflects interest group preferences against highly deferential review doc-
trines).
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opments have returned substantive review doctrine to its indeter-
minate state.
1. Scope of Review. The Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) establishes "substantial evidence"'45 and "arbitrary [and]
capricious"'  as the scope of review standards for agency ad-
judication and rulemaking. These phrases capture the general idea
of the appropriate level of deference47 and are somewhat
comprehensible in relation to each other.' But as those familiar
with administrative law know, the Supreme Court has failed to
give these tests precise content.
The substantial evidence standard, which applies to agency
fact finding in formal adjudications and some rulemakings,4 9 is
typically defined as "more than a mere scintilla" or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to sup-
port a conclusion."5 Although this standard is understood as be-
ing "highly deferential,"'" it has been applied with varying de-
grees of deference in different contexts. For example, federal
courts were less deferential in social security benefit cases when
the Social Security Administration (SSA) tightened eligibility stan-
dards in the 1980s. 2
Similarly, the arbitrary and capricious standard is relatively
open-ended, and the Supreme Court has not given it more precise
45. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
47. See infra notes 50-52, 53-58 and accompanying text.
48. American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,
412 n.7 (1983) (noting that the arbitrary and capricious test is "more lenient"). But see
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677,
686 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that the standards are identical as they apply to findings
of fact).
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
50. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (explaining that the evidence must be
"substantial" after the reviewing court takes into account "whatever in the record [that]
fairly detracts from its weight").
51. KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE § 11.2, at 177 (1994).
52. Carolyn A. Kubitschek, A Re-Evaluation of Mathews v. Eldridge in Light of Ad-
ministrative Shortcomings and Social Security Nonacquiescence, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 53,
75-76 (1989); Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations: Recommendations
for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 506-07. Federal judges "angered" by the SSA's
policy decisions increased the agency's rate of reversal from 20% to 57% during this
period. Pierce, Political Control, supra note 5, at 518.
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content. According to Overton Park, this scope of review is a
"narrow one" yet there should be "a thorough, probing in-depth
review" that is "searching and careful. 5 3 After the lower federal
courts interpreted the phrase "thorough, probing in-depth review"
as sanctioning aggressive (i.e., "hard look")' judicial review,5
the Court signaled its disapproval in Baltimore Gas & Electric.56
State Farm, however, again sent conflicting messages concerning
the appropriate level of deference. On the one hand, it warned
that the "scope of review ... is narrow and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."' On the other
hand, the majority seemingly engaged in aggressive substantive
review of one aspect of the agency decision in question.58
Despite the dual personality of State Farm, we previously
expressed the hope that it might lead to a more determinate ap-
proach to substantive review.59 In State Farm, the Court adopted
a more exact definition of the arbitrary and capricious standard
under which a court would look at four aspects of an agency's de-
cision: whether the agency relied on factors that Congress had not
intended it consider; whether the agency failed to consider "entire-
ly" an important aspect of the problem it was solving; whether the
agency offered an explanation for its decision that ran counter to
the evidence; and whether the agency's decision was so implausi-
ble that it could not be explained as a product of agency expertise
53. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
54. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 851 (1970).
55. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 511 (1974) (endorsing "hard look" review).
56. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S.
87, 103 (1983).
57. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
58. The Court unanimously concluded that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's (NHTSA) failure to consider an "airbags only" rule was arbitrary and
capricious in light of the agency's conclusion that manufacturers would opt for seatbelts if
given a choice; the Court's decision was uncontroversial. Id at 46-51. But the majority
also reversed as arbitrary and capricious NHTSA's finding that passive seat belts would
be ineffective because their uniform availability in cars would produce less than a 5% in-
crease in seat belt usage. Id. at 53-54. After careful scrutiny of the scientific studies that
NHTSA interpreted, the majority was unwilling to accept the agency's interpretation of
the evidence. Id. at 56. By comparison, the dissent argued that more deference was owed
to the agency's conclusions. Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
59. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 439.
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or a difference in view.6' Whether the Court actually intended to
adopt a more determinate standard is unclear. The opinion does
not stress this aspect of the case, although the definition is de-
scribed as a synthesis of prior law.6' In any case, the subsequent
actions of the Court show that it had no interest in enforcing a
more specific doctrine for scope of review. In the fifty-six cases
that we surveyed, the Court cited State Farm only fifteen times in
applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an adjudicatory
or rulemaking decision, and only four of the fifteen opinions men-
tion the State Farm criteria.62
Because the Supreme Court has not promoted use of the
State Farm criteria, the definition of "arbitrary and capricious"
remains relatively indeterminate. 63 In the 118 cases that we sur-
veyed, circuit courts cited State Farm only forty-five times in ap-
plying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an adjudicatory or
a rulemaking decision, and only thirteen of the forty-five cases
mentioned the State Farm criteria.' Our model predicts that
judges are freer to pursue an outcome orientation in this circum-
stance. Scope of review decisions that confirm our prediction of
60. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
61. Id.
62. We conducted a Westlaw search of decisions by the Supreme Court involving
judicial review of administrative decisions between June 1983 and June 1993. Our query
was "(arbitrary w/3 capricious) ("State Farm" w17 "463 U.S.") (Satisfactory w/2 explana-
tion w/5 actions) ("rational connection") ("adequate reasons") (5 w/2 U.S.C. w/2 706) %
To("Criminal Law")."
63. Moreover, State Farm and Baltimore Gas & Electric create a categorization prob-
lem. In Baltimore Gas & Electric, the Court held that when an agency "is making predic-
tions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science .... as opposed to
simple findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential." Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1985). Because State Farm appears to authorize less deferential review, a court must
decide when State Farm, instead of Baltimore Gas & Electric, applies. Glicksman &
Schroeder, supra note 5, at 296-97. Referring to this categorization problem, the Fifth
Circuit has noted that the Supreme Court's decisions "seem to embody two different
approaches that are, 'analytically in conflict "with the result that a court of appeals must
choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand .... Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n
v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 200 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990) (quoting HI-
Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 913-14 (3rd Cir. 1981)).
64. We conducted a Westlaw search of decisions by the United States Courts of
Appeals involving judicial review of administrative decisions between November 1992 and
November 1993. Our query was "(arbitrary w/3 capricious) ("State Farm" w17 "463 U.S.")
(Satisfactory w/2 explanation w/5 actions) ("rational connection") ("adequate reasons") (5
w/2 U.S.C. w/2 706)."
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result-oriented behavior are easy to find,' although the extent of
such behavior is uncertain.'
2. Statutory Interpretation. Judges are assisted in pursuing
an outcome orientation in administrative law not only by the rela-
tively open-ended nature of judicial review doctrines, but also by
the existence of manipulable categories to which different degrees
of deference apply. The reliance on categories dates back to
Hearst" and Packard,68 which established standards for
reviewing interpretations of statutes in formal adjudications. These
standards permit de novo review of pure questions of law, but
require deferential rational basis review of mixed questions of law
and fact. The difference between these two categories, however,
has not always been clear, as Hearst and Packard themselves
65. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE LJ. 1385, 1412 (1992) ("It is not hard to find examples of judicial overreach-
ing."); see also THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE
FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 260
(1993) (stating that OSHA's judicial review experience "provides ample evidence of the
difficulties that health and safety agencies face in attempting to promulgate rules"); JER-
RY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 200 (1990)
(arguing that NHTSA's "[Il]osses in court stymied, embarrassed, and ultimately
delegitimated the efforts of principal proponents of aggressive rulemaking"); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE LJ. 300, 302
(asserting that D.C. Circuit's review of agency policy decisions in the 1980s can only be
explained by the policy predilections of individual judges and whether the majority of
judges on a panel was appointed by a Republican or Democratic president); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Unruly Judicial Review of Rulemaking, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1990,
at 23, 24 (stating that D.C. Circuit's review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
regulations demonstrates a "remarkable [judicial] instinct for the capillary"). See generally
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme
Court's Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 422 (1989) (discussing why
Supreme Court environmental law decisions have pursued a consistently pro-development
policy).
66. See ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE EPA 153 (1993) ("While the findings of this study do not necessarily negate a con-
clusion that some judges have become increasingly deliberate and aggressive in shaping
regulatory policy, it is clear that a sweeping conclusion that judges generally have become
increasingly deliberate and aggressive is not supported by the totality of the evidence.");
Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 779; Patricia M.
Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 621, 645 (1994); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Re-
view, and the Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986 DUKE L.J. 258, 267.
67. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
68. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
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demonstrate. Judges have been able therefore to manipulate the
"law" and "fact" categories to affect the standard of review.70
Chevron replaced the Hearst/Packard distinction with a distinction
between clear and ambiguous statutes, but this change has not
brought about more determinacy. Under Chevron's now famous
two-step test, a court first inquires whether a statute is clear
because Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." And if a statute "is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue," a court is to defer to any "permissible construction
of the statute."'"
After Chevron was decided, it appeared for a time that the
Court had introduced less manipulable categories than the prior
distinction between questions of "law" and "fact." The language in
Chevron appeared to order courts to go to step two if there was
any ambiguity concerning Congress' intent about the meaning of a
statutory term.72 Since few statutes are absolutely clear, this ap-
proach appeared to create a presumption of statutory ambiguity
that would be difficult to rebut.73 Whatever the merits of this
approach concerning its impact on separation of powers princi-
ples,74 it would have made judicial review more determinate. In
most cases, the courts would have moved to step two. At step
two, judges would normally affirm an agency's interpretation of its
69. In Hearst, the Court treated the definition of "employee" under the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act as a pure question of law for purposes of determining whether
the term incorporated common law standards, but as a mixed question for purposes of
determining whether newsboys were employees. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128-32. In
Packard, however, the Court treated the question whether foremen were employees with-
in the meaning of the Act as a pure question of law. See Packard, 330 U.S. at 488-92.
70. In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), for example, the Court
"did precisely what it reversed the circuit court for doing in Hearst in the context of in-
terpretation of the same term in the same statute." RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 349 (2d ed. 1992).
71. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (citation omitted).
72. Id. at 843; Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470
U.S. 116, 125 (1985).
73. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE LJ. 819, 859.
74. Compare Farina, supra note 5, at 498 (arguing that highly deferential Chevron
test is inconsistent with separation of powers principle) with Marshall J. Breger, A
Conservative's Comments on Edley and Sunstein, 1991 DUKE LJ. 671, 677 (arguing that
highly deferential Chevron test is appropriate in light of political accountability) and
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative
Law, 64 TEX. L. RE.. 469, 505-06 (1985) (same).
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mandate, except in the rare cases in which the agency did not
have a "permissible" construction of its mandate.' The Court,
however, has taken a different tack. It will move to step two only
if it cannot determine Congress's intent by using tools of statutory
construction.76 Since such tools are inherently imprecise,' the
Court has returned to a situation in which manipulable categories
of different degrees of deference apply.78
Statistical evidence confirms that the Chevron framework has
not led to a more determinate approach to judicial review. As dis-
cussed above, most cases would be resolved in favor of the agency
at step two under the determinate version of Chevron. Yet, the
rate of affirmance of agencies in the Supreme Court79 and the
circuit courts' is about the same now as (or even lower than)
75. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
76. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). In this deci-
sion, even Justice Scalia, the most ardent supporter of the more deferential version of
Chevron, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring),
relied on a traditional tool. Arabian American, 499 U.S. at 259-60 (finding that presump-
tion against extraterritorial application of statutes rendered agency construction unreason-
able at step two of Chevron).
77. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fic-
tions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHi. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (1990).
78. The Court has created a vagueness issue as well. Chevron requires a court to
affirm an agency at step two if the agency's construction of the statute is a "permissible
construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Although the term "permissible" appears to require sub-
stantial deference by the courts to the agency's statutory interpretation, the Court did not
define the criteria that a court should use in making this judgment. See infra notes 94,
96 and accompanying text (proposing criteria for this judgment).
In addition, there is a second categorization problem. If a court wishes to avoid
giving the deference required by step two to an agency's statutory interpretation, it can
characterize the agency's interpretation as a policy decision and review it under State
Farm. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1511, 1548 (1992); see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (propos-
ing a solution to this categorization problem).
79. William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have calculated that agency positions pre-
vailed in 62% of civil cases in the 1993 term. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 72 (1994). By comparison,
Thomas Merrill has found that the Supreme Court affirmed agencies about 70% of the
time for the five years following Chevron as compared to 75% of the time for the three
years preceding Chevron. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
101 YALE L.J. 969, 984 (1992).
80. Peter Schuck and Donald Elliot calculated that the rate of affirmance in the
federal appellate courts was 75.5% three years after Chevron as compared to 70.9% for
the year preceding Chevron. Schuck & Elliot, supra note 5, at 1038. Another analysis
concludes that the affirmance rate dropped from the lower to mid-70% range in
1983-1987 to the 60-70% range in 1988-1990. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer,
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before Chevron was decided. More tellingly, the Supreme Court
only applies the Chevron framework in about one-third of its cases
in which agency deference is an issue.81
The Court may not have intended that Chevron establish a
more determinate (and more deferential) standard of review for
agency statutory interpretation.' Chevron, however, did empha-
size judicial deference to agencies because Congress implicitly
delegated discretion to them and because they have greater policy
expertise and political accountability than the courts.' Moreover,
as Peter Strauss has explained, the Supreme Court must establish
strong craft norms to control the behavior of the lower courts
because it is unable to review more than a few administrative law
cases each year.' If the Court intended a more determinate stan-
dard, its retreat can be explained in two ways. On the one hand,
the Court may have taken to heart the criticism that a high level
of deference to agency interpretation of statutes threatened sepa-
ration of powers principles.' On the other hand, the Court may
have found that the original Chevron framework overly con-
strained its own capacity to pursue an outcome orientation. As
Thomas Merrill has pointed out, the original framework did not
allow the Justices to take into account the variability of adminis-
trative decisions. 6 Moreover, Chevron was decided at a time
when both the Administration and the Court's dominant public
policy perspectives were conservative;' a highly deferential Chev-
ron protected the administration from the liberal judges that re-
mained on the lower courts. The switch to a more indeterminate
approach gives the Justices greater leeway to superintend the ad-
Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., winter-Spring 1994, at 65,
103.
81. Merrill, supra note 79, at 980-82, 984; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 361-62 (1994) (stating
that the Court largely ignored the Chevron framework in the 1992 Term).
82. Chevron can be understood as a modem updating of the Hearst/Packard distinc-
tions. Marshall J. Breger, Defining Administrative Law-A Review of AN INTRODUCTION
TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 268, 285
(1991).
83. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844-45 (1984).
84. Strauss, supra note 5, at 1101.
85. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
86. Merrill, supra note 79, at 1027.
87. See Levy, supra note 16, at 342.
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ministrative policies of less conservative administrations. It also
opens the door for more aggressive judicial review by the many
conservative judges now on the lower federal courts.'
III. JuDIcIAL REVIEW REFORM
As the foregoing analysis suggests, judicial incentives in ad-
ministrative law favor the development of indeterminate standards
of review that facilitate an outcome orientation. Judicial behavior
is consistent with this prediction. In particular, the courts have
avoided interpretations of Chevron and State Farm that would
have established more determinate craft norms. Many commenta-
tors have criticized the overly aggressive judicial review that inde-
terminate craft norms foster, but their proposed reforms generally
fail to account for the incentives that favor indeterminacy in judi-
cial review and the mechanisms fostering that indeterminacy.
Effective reform requires a statutory reorientation of judicial
review away from categorical standards and towards a single, com-
prehensive set of specific inquiries. These inquiries should be suffi-
ciently demanding in order to enable courts to fulfill their proper
role in the separation of powers while providing more determinate
craft norms that increase the costs of improper intervention. No
reform can completely eliminate outcome-driven judicial decisions,
but effective reform can build on the constraining effect of craft
norms.
A. Preliminary Observations
A wealth of literature on the appropriate scope of judicial
review of agency decisions exists, with much of the recent litera-
ture spawned by Chevron and State Farm and their subsequent
histories.8 9 This literature reflects differing perspectives on the ap-
propriate degree of deference that should be accorded adminis-
trative agencies,' and any recommendations for reform must ad-
dress this issue. As in our prior work,91 we advocate an interme-
88. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 80, at 108-09 (predicting that Reagan-era Justic-
es would affirm Reagan-era appointees in the lower courts who were tough on Clinton
administration policies); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 79, at 76 (discussing how the
1993 Term provides "some evidence" to support the Cohen & Spitzer prediction).
89. See sources cited supra note 5.
90. See, e.g., supra note 74 (citing examples).
91. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 440.
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diate position: judges must have the authority to enforce the rule
of law, which is their constitutional function under separation of
powers, but they should not have excessive discretion to intervene
simply on the basis of policy disagreements with an agency. Most
observers will agree with our underlying premises. The difficulty is
where the appropriate balance between these two competing con-
siderations should be drawn.'
Although striking the appropriate balance is no easy matter,
the foregoing discussion leads to three conclusions concerning how
reform of judicial review should proceed. First, the starting point
for reform is to raise the cost of pursuing outcome by decreasing
the indeterminacy of craft. In particular, reform should address the
two sources of indeterminacy described above: vague standards
and manipulable categories. Second, our model suggests that pro-
posals directed to the judiciary within the existing framework for
review are likely to fail. As long as judges can define the degree
of determinacy, they will seek to reduce the cost of pursuit of
outcome by relying on indeterminate standards of review. Thus, as
a threshold matter, reform of substantive review should come in
statutory form, as an amendment to section 706 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)." Finally, no reform can completely
eliminate the pursuit of outcome, even if this goal is appropriate.
Different judges will value craft and outcome differently, and
some judges will prefer an outcome orientation even in the face of
relatively determinate craft. If craft norms focus on more specific
issues, however, judges will be more likely to articulate their justi-
fications for reversing agencies (or remanding decisions) in terms
of appropriate considerations.
B. Amending Section 706
In light of the previous conclusions, we propose the following
amended version of section 706:'
92. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 5, at 300-301 (describing the tradeoffs
involved in striking an appropriate balance between the institutional roles of agencies and
the courts).
93. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
94. The Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine adopted by the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association is the inspiration for this approach. Section of
Administrative Law, American Bar Association, A Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doc-
trine, 38 ADMiN. L. REv. 235 (1986). The section's recommendations were based on a
report by Ronald Levin. Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated- An Admin-
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§ 706. Scope of Review
The reviewing court shall... (2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions, findings, and conclusions if the court determines
that
(A) the agency decision violates a constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(B) the agency decision was made without observance of proce-
dure required by law;
(C) the agency decision violates its statutory mandate or other
statutory provisions because:
(1) the issue has been specifically resolved by explicit statu-
tory language;
(2) the issue has been specifically resolved by legislative
history manifesting an unmistakable congressional intent; or
(3) a contrary interpretation of the statute is unequivocally
required by the traditional tools of statutory construction;
(D) the agency has not offered a valid policy explanation for its
decision because:
(1) it relied on policy concerns that were precluded by stat-
ute; or
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem; or
(E) the agency has not offered a logically coherent explanation in
terms of agency expertise, credibility determinations, or policy
considerations, of
(1) why the evidence in the record supports its decision; or
(2) why the contrary evidence does not preclude the deci-
sion.
Subsections (C), (D), and (E), which are the key provisions in
the proposed amendment,5 change existing law in two important
respects. First, we have reoriented substantive review by avoiding
the use of open-ended scope of review standards, employing in-
stead specific inquiries that, to the extent possible, eschew the use
of vague adjectives reflecting degrees of deference. Second, we
have eliminated the categories of agency decisions, employing
instead a single, comprehensive set of inquiries that apply to all
istrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239 (1986).
95. Subsections (A) and (B) retain existing language with modified phrasing not
intended to affect their operation. The de novo review provision, currently § 706(2)(F),
has been eliminated because it has no application under the statute as currently interpret-
ed. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
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agency decisions, cutting down on the opportunity for manipula-
tion of categories.96
Subsection (C) obviously draws on the Chevron test, but we
have attempted to render that test more determinate in two ways.
First, the application of this approach would be mandatory; judges
would not be in a position to ignore it, as they have ignored
Chevron in some recent decisions. 7 Second, subsection (C) pro-
vides more determinate standards concerning when a court should
defer to an agency's construction of a statutory provision. In par-
ticular, it specifies standards for reliance on statutory text, legisla-
tive history, and tools of statutory construction. By comparison,
the Court's present approach to step one of Chevron gives little
guidance concerning this issue.
Subsections (D) and (E) incorporate the four inquiries em-
ployed in State Farm to define arbitrary and capricious review.
Those incorporated in subsection (D) involve the relationship
between the agency's policy choice and the policy judgment made
by Congress, effectively requiring the agency to justify its decision
in terms of the legislative policies reflected in the agency's statu-
tory mandate.9 8 Those reflected in subsection (E) address the re-
lationship between the policy choices made by the agency and the
record on which the agency bases its decision.
Although we draw on the language used in State Farm, our
version is more determinate for several reasons. First, rather than
employing these inquiries as interpretations of the open-ended
arbitrary and capricious standard, we have omitted the standard
altogether and require courts to move directly to consideration of
the specific inquiries. This prevents courts from ignoring the State
Farm factors and eliminates the indeterminacy inherent in the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.99 Second, by clarify-
96. The Administrative Conference also has recommended the merging of Chevron
and State Farm. See Administrative Conference of the United States, Adoption of Recom-
mendations and Statement Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 59 Fed.
Reg. 4669, 4671-72 (1994) [hereinafter Administrative Conference Recommendations].
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98. See Levin, supra note 94, at 250-53.
99. We do not believe that a separate "substantial evidence" standard for on the
record adjudications is necessary in light of the convergence of fact review in rulemaking
and adjudication. See, e.g., PIERCE ET AL., supra note 70, § 7.3.3 at 342. Our formula-
tion of these inquiries, however, incorporates some of the considerations relevant to sub-
stantial evidence review. In particular, we recognize the validity of credibility determi-
nations as valid explanations for an agency's view of the record as well as the possibility
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ing the relationship between Chevron and State Farm as part of a
single inquiry,"° our approach minimizes the opportunities for
manipulation by characterizing these sorts of issues alternatively as
statutory interpretation or a policy question subject to arbitrary
and capricious review. 1
C. Allocation of Responsibility
The proposed amendment not only makes judicial review doc-
trines more determinate, but also allocates responsibility between
agencies and the courts for the development of administrative
policy. As indicated earlier, our goal is to allocate to judges suffi-
cient authority to enforce the rule of law, but to limit their discre-
tion to intervene simply on the basis of policy disagreements with
an agency.
As in Chevron, subsection (C) allocates the responsibility for
statutory interpretation between the courts and agencies by focus-
ing on legislative intent. This subsection further seeks to limit
judicial intervention by circumscribing the use of statutory text,
legislative history, and tools of construction. First, subsection
(C)(1) requires specific and explicit language to justify reversing an
agency on the basis of statutory text. This limitation recognizes the
constitutionally appropriate role of the courts as interpreters of
statutes without granting judges undue license to intervene. Sec-
ond, subsection (C)(2) authorizes a court to overturn an agency
construction on the basis of legislative history only if it provides
"unmistakable" evidence of intent. Justice Scalia, of course, has
opposed recourse to legislative history on the ground that only the
statute has been approved by Congress and, for various reasons,
legislative history may not be an accurate reflection of intent."°
But while legislative history may not always be a reliable guide, it
is in some cases; to ignore unmistakable evidence of legislative
intent is, in our view, inappropriate. 3 Finally, subsection (C)(3)
that an agency might base its factual finding on expert judgments. See Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495-97 (1951) (suggesting that a reviewing court must de-
fer if an agency factfinding is based upon credibility determinations or expertise).
100. In effect, we treat the first two parts of the State Farm inquiry as Chevron step
two. See Administrative Conference Recommendations, supra note 96, at 4672.
101. This approach also eliminates the added possibility for manipulation inherent in
the separate substantial evidence standard.
102. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE Li. 511, 517.
103. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
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authorizes a court to overturn an agency construction on the basis
of traditional tools of construction only if such tools "unequivocal-
ly" contradict the agency's interpretation. This standard should
limit the manipulability of these tools without completely sacrific-
ing whatever insights their use might produce.
Our goal in subsections (D) and (E) is to focus the reviewing
court's attention on the agency's reasons, rather than its ultimate
policy judgment, because we believe that courts have a constitu-
tional responsibility to ensure the rationality of agency
decisionmaking 4 As with subsection (C), we could not com-
pletely avoid the use of qualitative judgments that leave some
room for manipulation. By focusing on the agency's reasoning pro-
cess, however, we attempt to limit the invitation to second-guess
the agency's underlying policy choices. 5 Moreover, because sub-
section (E) requires only that the agency have a "coherent" expla-
nation for its actions, judges are discouraged from establishing
their own baseline for what constitutes a "rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made."'136 Finally, the
standards contained in our proposed amendment focus judicial re-
view on the institutional reasons for deference. Subsections (D)
and (E) make clear that the focus for judicial review is not the re-
sult reached by the agency, but rather whether the agency's use of
expertise, credibility determinations, and policy judgment is coher-
ent in lightof its statutory mandate and the record for the deci-
sion."° As we have argued previously, "This distinction is impor-
tant because it reminds judges that they are not to substitute their
judgment for the policy choices of an agency and that the agency's
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1357-60
(1990) (discussing how factfinding approach to legislative history would improve ascertain-
ment of legislative intent).
104. This was the thesis of our prior work on substantive review. See Shapiro &
Levy, supra note 5, at 388, 440.
105. See id. at 437.
106. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). See
McGarity, supra note 65, at 1453 (advocating the use of a "pass-fail" standard to deter-
mine acceptability of agency reasons for adopting a policy); but see Wald, supra note 66,
at 644 (expressing skepticism about the utility of a "pass-fail" standard).
107. See Seidenfeld, supra note 78, at 1548-49 (proposing that the reviewing court's
role is to ensure that the agency interpreted its mandate in a deliberate manner).
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reasoning may withstand scrutiny even if a judge disagrees with
the result.''""a
Given the diversity of views on the appropriate role of courts
in reviewing administrative agencies, we expect that others will dis-
agree with the specifics of the role we prescribe for reviewing
courts. In the context of this article, it is neither necessary nor
possible to defend these specifics in detail. Our point in this con-
text is that whatever standards are chosen, the statutory provisions
governing substantive review of agency decisions should be ren-
dered more determinate. Moreover, the debate over what stan-
dards to use should take place in the context of a comprehensive
judicial review framework that avoids open-ended standards of
deference and limits the opportunities for categorization.
D. Implications for Judicial Behavior
As explained above, the proposed section 706 is significantly
more determinate than existing doctrines concerning both statutory
interpretation and agency policy choices."° By increasing the lev-
el of determinacy and hence the costs of pursuing outcome, the
amendment should constrain outcome-oriented behavior of judges
to a greater degree than the current craft norms for judicial re-
view. 10 To the extent that judges may nonetheless be sufficiently
motivated to pursue outcome, we believe that the proposed
amendment would also improve the quality of analysisl in decisions
reversing agencies.
Our model establishes that the more determinate the frame-
work for review, the greater the costs of pursuing outcome. First,
when craft norms are more determinate, the sacrifice of craft in
pursuit of outcome is more apparent, subjecting the judge to a loss
of reputation and respect (including self respect).' Second, even
if it is ultimately possible to reconcile the pursuit of outcome with
108. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 5, at 437-38.
109. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
110. Mark Tushnet has argued that it is impossible to establish a norm that both
permits judicial review and limits the ability of judges to invalidate political decisions of
the other branches. Mark V. Tushnet, Judicial Review, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 77,
77 (1984). While it is perhaps true that no substantive review doctrine can absolutely
prevent judicial intervention in administrative policy decisions, we do believe that it is
possible to increase the costs of unwarranted intervention by making doctrine more deter-
minate.
1 111. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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more determinate craft norms, such a reconciliation would take
additional effort on the part of judges, entailing the sacrifice of
leisure.
Conversely, more determinate craft norms also decrease the
ideological utility to be gained from pursuit of outcome. They
increase the likelihood that institutional constraints such as collegi-
ality and appeal would render pursuit of outcome unsuccessful." 2
Moreover, to the extent that craft is also part of ideology, more
determinate craft norms increase the ideological utility from pur-
suit of craft."' This countervailing ideological consideration off-
sets the ideological utility from pursuit of outcome and reduces the
net ideological utility derived from an outcome-oriented decision.
By increasing the costs and decreasing the benefits from pur-
suit of outcome, we expect that judges will be less outcome-orient-
ed in their decisions. Of course, strong outcome related incentives
may still tip the balance for individual judges in individual cases.
Even in such cases, we believe that our approach to substantive
review will structure the analysis more appropriately. The current
approach obscures the reviewing court's real reasons for interven-
ing by focusing the analysis on categorizing the agency decision
and on whether the result reached by the agency is sufficiently bad
to justify intervention under an open-ended test for deference. The
proposed amendment to § 706, in contrast, requires judges to ask
the right questions and to explain their rejection of an agency
decision in terms of considerations that derive from the constitu-
tionally designated role of the courts.
CONCLUSION
We have no magic solution to a problem-indeterminate sub-
stantive review doctrines-that has plagued administrative law
since its inception. We propose, however, that if judicial incentives
for preferring indeterminate standards are better understood, there
is greater potential for making judicial review more determinate.
Judges prefer indeterminate standards in administrative law be-
cause they reduce the loss of respect normally associated with an
outcome orientation and because there are few incentives to devel-
op determinate craft norms that control future cases. Congress can
112. See supra text following note 32.
113. See supra text following note 27.
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constrain this behavior if it amends section 706 of the APA as we
propose. Our proposal, which consists of a single, comprehensive
set of specific inquiries, addresses both sources of indeterminacy in
current substantive review doctrine: vague scope of review stan-
dards and reliance on manipulable categories to define the appro-
priate scope of review. Although not everyone may agree with the
specific standards we have chosen, the amendment has the virtue
of focusing the reform debate on what specific, comprehensive
standards should be used. If Congress adopts more determinate
standards, outcome-oriented behavior by judges should decrease.
